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Abstract
A puzzling feature of pharmaceuticals markets is that sellers of branded
drugs will, sometimes, sell generic versions of their own branded products,
either directly or through license agreements. This paper proposes a new
theoretical rationale for the fact that the introduction of these pseudo-
generics may have anti-competitive effects. In a model that combines
horizontal and vertical product differentiation, we show that the producer
of the branded product will not sell the pseudo-generic unless faced with
competition and that, if she does so, in some circumstances, all prices
raise to the benefit of all competitors and the detriment of consumers.
Keywords: Pseudo-Generics; Product Differentiation; Pharmaceutical
Pricing
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1 Introduction
In recent decades, generics became an important competitive force in phar-
maceutical markets, gaining considerable market share from branded products.
Generics, according to the US Food and Drug Administration, "(...) are copies
of brand-name drugs and are the same as those brand name drugs in dosage
form, safety, strength, route of administration, quality, performance character-
istics and intended use".1 Generics may enter the market if a patent-holder
waives its rights or, more often, when the patents that protect a branded prod-
uct expire. As imitators, generic producers do not incur significant research and
development costs and are able to charge very competitive prices.





It has been observed that, sometimes, the producers of a branded pharma-
ceutical will sell a generic version of their own branded product, either directly
or through license agreements. 2 These versions are often known in the litera-
ture as pseudo-generics.The rationale for selling pseudo-generics is not obvious:
given its much lower price, selling a pseudo-generic seems to risk cannibalizing
the sales of the, more profitable, branded product. Some type of strategic im-
pact on other generic competitors seems necessary to justify their use, which
sugests the possibility of anticompetitive effects.
The theoretical literature on the competitive implications of pseudo-generics
is rather limited. Ferrándiz [3] presents a model in which firms A and B sell sub-
stitutable branded drugs under two alternative scenarios: in one of the scenarios,
a third firm sells a generic version of A’s drug; in the other scenario, the third
firm doesn’t exist but A itself sells a pseudo-generic. Unsurprisingly, this author
concludes that consumers would be better off in the first scenario but A prefers
the second one. Kamien and Zang [5] assume that, when patents for the branded
pharmaceutical expire, there is free generic entry. They build scenarios with and
without a pseudo-generic to study the conditions under which it would be sold
and conclude that selling the pseudo-generic is a dominant strategy. But these
authors assume that the type of interaction between the brand-name producer
and its competitors depends on whether the former is selling a pseudo-generic:
if she is not, all firms choose quantities simultaneously (Cournot) but if she
is, then she has a first-mover advantage towards the competitors in choosing
the quantities of both the branded drug and the pseudo-generic (Stackelberg).
We find this crucial assumption unconvincing and feel it casts doubt on the
generality of their conclusions. More recently, Kong and Seldon [6] have tried
to rationalize pseudo-generics as an instrument to deter entry, in a model a la
Dixit [2], but their results seem flawed [7].
This paper proposes a new theoretical rationale for the fact that the in-
troduction of pseudo-generics may have anticompetitive effects. In our model,
firms are price-setters in a market where both vertical and horizontal differenti-
ation are present: branded pharmaceuticals are vertically differentiated towards
generics (they are perceived as being strictly better), but generics are horizon-
tally differentiated among themselves. In this setting, we show that the presence
of pseudo-generics may result in higher prices for every variety of the product,
to consumers detriment.
That branded pharmaceuticals, which have been in the market for a con-
siderable period under patent, may be perceived by consumers as being better
than newcomer non-branded generics, in spite of health authorities claims to
the contrary, we regard as obvious. But a crucial assumption of our model, that
requires justification, is that generics may be perceived as horizontally differen-
tiated. Even if they are "therapeutically equivalent" to the branded product,
and thus also among themselves, generics may differ along many easily observ-
2The frequency with which this happens varies considerably from country to country, pos-
sibiliy as a result of legal and institutional differences: Hollis [4] claims that they represent
roughly one quarter of total generic sales in Canada and Australia, and also have strong
positions in New Zeland, Germany, UK and Sweden.
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able dimensions: ingredients other than the active substances may, and do, differ
and characteristics such as flavour, shape, and color are usually different. Be-
sides, packages and labels may vary significantly. Further, although they do not
carry a product brand (the product will be described as "acetylsalicylic acid",
not as "Aspirin", for example), they generally identify the producer (it will be
acetylsalicylic acid by XYZpharma, for example): there is no a priori reason to
assume that consumers, or whoever chooses the product for them, are less sen-
sitive to the identity of the producer in this type of product than in any other.
Thus, we regard the assumption of horizontal differentiation among generics as
a reasonable one.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces
our model. For benchmark purposes, in section 3 we apply it in a monopoly
situation. In the fourth section, we analyze oligopolistic competition under two
alternative scenarios: with and without the pseudo-generic. Section 5, builds on
previous results to determine the competitive impact of the pseudo-generic. We
then discuss our results and conclude.
2 The model
In our model, there are two firms: an incumbent (I) and an entrant (E), indexed
by j = I, E. These firms compete by simultaneously setting the prices of the
products they sell. The incumbent sells a certain pharmaceutical product under
a specific brand. She can also, if she chooses to, sell a generic, non-branded,
variety of the product. The entrant, on the other hand, can only sell a generic
variety. Let b (brand) refer to the branded variety of the product, g (generic)
to the non-branded variety produced by the entrant, and pg (pseudo-generic)
to the non-branded variety produced by the incumbent. Capitalized forms B,
PG, and G refer to quantities or demand functions of these product varieties.
Branded and generic varieties of the product are fundamentally identical but
consumers perceive them as being vertically differentiated. Moreover, and as ex-
plained above, consumers perceive generic varieties produced by different firms
as horizontally differentiated. This being the case, this model assumes that con-
sumers vary in their preferences over the differentiated generic pharmaceutical
product. The market is then composed of a uniform mass of consumers dis-
tributed over a unidimensional space of product characteristics, defined by the
interval [0, 1]. The disutility of consuming a generic product variety other than
one’s ideal variety is assumed to be linear in the distance along this Hotelling
interval, with slope t > 0.
Let ci denote consumer i’s type, where ci measures the distance between
consumer i’s location and the left endpoint of the unit interval. To reflect the
existence of vertical differentiation between the branded good and the generic al-
ternatives, we assume that a consumer’s reservation price regarding the branded
variety (β) is higher than her reservation price corresponding to a generic prod-
uct (γ). More formally, β > γ > 0. In addition, and a consequence of horizontal
differentiation, if the consumer decides to buy a generic variety, her surplus de-
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pends negatively on the distance between her location and the location of the
seller in the generics product space she is buying from, where we denote by fj
firm j’s location.
Consumers purchase either one unit or none. Each consumer opts for the
product that provides her the most surplus, as long as this surplus is positive.
Denoting by (pb, pg, ppg) the vector of prices, consumer ci’s individual surplus
is given by:
CSi =
 β − pb if she buys bγ − pk − t× |fj − ci| , k = g, pg if she buys g or pg
0 otherwise
. (1)
Two additional remarks are in order at this point. First, as they are not
fundamental for the purpose of this article, which is to illustrate a mechanism
through which pseudo-generics can have anti-competitive effects, we normalize
production costs to zero. Second, since, without loss of generality, we normal-
ized the total number of consumers to be equal to 1, quantities may also be
interpreted as market shares.
The following two sections compare firms’profits and consumers’surplus in
alternative situations.
3 The monopolist’s benchmark case
Consider first the case in which the incumbent is a monopolist, possibly because
she is protected by patents. This being the case, she may either sell only the
branded variety of the product or both the branded and the (pseudo-)generic
varieties. However, in this perfect information setting, as the reservation price
for generic varieties is lower than the reservation price for the branded variety
(i.e., β > γ) and their respective production costs are identical (and equal to
zero), it never pays to sell a generic variety along with the branded product.
The incumbent then sets a price p1b = β for the branded variety. As a conse-
quence, every consumer buys this branded product, getting zero surplus, and
the incumbent’s profit equals Π1I = β.
4 Oligopolistic competition
Consider now the case of oligopolistic competition, say because the patents
that protected the incumbent have expired and, as a result, she starts facing
competition by an entrant.
In what follows, we assume that the entrant’s (generic) variety of the product
is located at the left endpoint of the generics’product space (fE = 0) - the unit
interval - and that, if it is available, the pseudo-generic is located at point fI
along the (0, 1] segment. There are two different scenarios of interest, depending
on whether the incumbent is present in the market with only one variety (the
branded good) or with two varieties (the branded good and the pseudo-generic),
which we discuss in turn.
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4.1 The incumbent does not sell a pseudo-generic
Assume the incumbent sells only the branded variety and the entrant sells the
generic variety. When this is the case, Figure 1 illustrates the determination
of the demand for each product variety, for given location and prices. This
Figure implicitly assumes that the generic variety is suffi ciently cheaper than
the branded product so as to have positive demand. Specifically, it assumes
pb−pg > β−γ. The location of the “marginal consumer”cb.g, who is indifferent
between varieties b and g, follows from solving γ − pg − t× cb.g = β − pb:
cb.g =
(pb − pg)− (β − γ)
t
. (2)
With the total number of consumers equal to 1, the demand functions for
each variety of the product are simply:
B (pb, pg) = 1− cb.g = 1−
(pb − pg)− (β − γ)
t
, (3a)
G (pb, pg) = cb.g =
(pb − pg)− (β − γ)
t
. (3b)
With no production costs, profit functions are ΠB (pb, pg) = B (pb, pg) pb
and ΠE (pb, pg) = G (pb, pg) pg. Maximizing these with respect to pb and pg,
one obtains the best-response functions:
pb =




pb − (β − γ)
2
(4b)













(β − γ) (5b)










t− (β − γ)
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(6b)














Figure 1: Determination of demand functions, when the incumbent sells a
branded variety of the product and the entrant sells a generic variety, assuming
the entrant is located at the left end of the market
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Figure 2: Restrictions on parameter values, when the incumbent sells the
branded variety and the entrant sells a generic variety: results in section 4.1
hold for parameter values in the shaded area
Restrictions on parameter values For these results to hold, some restric-
tions must be imposed on parameter values. Basically, these assure that the
branded variety is perceived as better than the generic, but not so much better
that no one would buy the latter, and that the product is suffi ciently valuable
for everyone to be willing to buy it (market is fully covered under competition).
Under these conditions, both varieties will be simultaneously sold at a profit.
Figure 2 illustrates the necessary restrictions on β and γ, as a function of t.
In equilibrium, the indifferent consumer must be located in the [0, 1] segment,
i.e., 0 < cb.g < 1, as assumed. Simple algebra shows that the right-hand side
condition cb.g < 1 always holds since t > 0 and β > γ. As for cb.g > 0,it must
be that
β < t+ γ. (8)
If β exceeds the threshold value t+ γ, then incumbent can raise its price above
p2b without inducing the entrant to sell the generic. Specifically, the incumbent
can set a limit price of pb = β− γ and sell to the entire market, with a profit of
Πb = β − γ.
Notice, however, that the previous conditions are not enough for our previous
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results to be valid: even if located in the [0, 1] segment, the indifferent consumer
could get negative surplus from both varieties. In order for this not to happen,
let β ≥ pb. In equilibrium, this is equivalent to
β ≥ t− γ
2
(9)
If this condition doesn’t hold, then the incumbent will be restricted to pb = β
and the entrant will respond with pg =
γ
2 . This in turn implies that profits will
be ΠI = β (1− γ/2t) and ΠE = γ2/4t.
Summing up, the results in this section apply if conditions 8 and 9 hold.3
Hence, the relevant region of parameter values is the one illustrated with the
shaded area in Figure 2.
4.2 The incumbent sells a pseudo-generic
Consider now the case in which the incumbent, faced with generic competition
by an entrant, sells also a non-branded version of her own product, which we
call a pseudo-generic.
Assume the pseudo-generic is located suffi ciently close to the entrant’s generic
product for some consumer to be indifferent between them: otherwise, there
would be no strategic interaction between the two products and, therefore, no
reason for the incumbent to sell the pseudo-generic. Denote by cg.pg the loca-
tion of this consumer and by fI the location of the pseudo generic variety in
the generics product space. Assuming the pseudo-generic does not cannibalize
the incumbent’s whole market, there will also be some consumer crb.pg that is
indifferent between the pseudo-generic and the branded variety of the product.
Here, the superscript r indicates that this consumer is located to the right of fI .
We will later use the notation clb.pg for the consumer that is indifferent between
these varieties to the left of fI . The determination of the demand functions for
the three varieties of the product is illustrated in Figure 3.
Solving γ − pg − t × cg.pg = γ − ppg − t × (fI − cg.pg), the location of the












= β − pb, the location of the
consumer indifferent between the two varieties sold by the incumbent is:







The demand functions are
3Recall also that t > 0 and β > γ.
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Figure 3: Determination of demand functions, when the incumbent sells both
a branded and a generic variety of the product and the entrant sells a generic
version, assuming the entrant is located at the left end of the market and the
incumbent at fI
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B (pb, ppg, pg) = 1− crb.pg = 1− fI +
(β − γ)− (pb − ppg)
t
(12a)











− ppg − pg
2t
(12b)







Profit functions are then:
ΠI (pb, ppg, pg) = B (pb, ppg, pg)× pb + PG (pb, ppg, pg)× ppg
and
ΠE (pb, ppg, pg) = G (pb, ppg, pg)× pg.

























Solving the system composed of the previous three equations, one obtains
the equilibrium price for each of the three varieties present in the market:
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2 (16b)
Restrictions on parameter values Again, for these results to be valid,
some restrictions must be imposed on the parameters, which we discuss in what
follows.
First, as in the previous subsection, we require that some but not all con-
sumers prefer the entrant’s generic to the incumbent’s branded variety. More
formally, we require that that 0 ≤ cb.g ≤ 1. The first inequality is equivalent to







The second inequality implies that







Second, to guarantee that some but not all consumers prefer the pseudo-
generic to the entrant’s variety, we require that: (i) crb.pg > cb.g; and (ii) γ −






If this holds, any β > γ will satisfy 18.
Third, we also require that some but not all consumers prefer the branded
variety of the product to the pseudo-generic, i.e., fI < crb.pg < 1. The second
inequality is trivially satisfied for any t > 0, β > γ and 0 < fI < 1. The first
inequality, on the other hand, is equivalent to require that:
β < γ + t (1− fI) (20)
Fourth, our solution assumes also that the consumer who is indifferent be-
tween the two generic varieties does not prefer the branded variety. Otherwise,
the incumbent would not sell the pseudo-generic. Thus, we require also that
cb.g ≥ clb.pg, which implies that:







It should be noted that condition 21 is more restrictive than either 17 and 20.
Finally, we assume that the branded variety, and, therefore, every other
variety, provides non-negative surplus, i.e., β ≥ pb. This is equivalent to:




Figure 4: Restrictions on parameter values when the incumbent sells both
branded and pseudo-generic varieties of the product and the entrant sells a
generic: results in section 4.2. hold for parameter values in the dark shaded
area, assuming fI = 0.5; results in section 4.1. hold for both the dark and the
light shaded areas
Summing up, the active restrictions are, thus, 19, 21, and 22. Figure 4
summarizes the restrictions that apply to the demand parameters β and γ, for
fI = 0.5 and a specific value of t.
5 Price and profit impact of the pseudo-generic
We now turn to the main results in the paper, where we determine the compet-
itive impact due to the pseudo-generic introduction in an oligopolistic setting.
Proposition 1 For parameter values satisfying conditions 19, 21, and 22, the
introduction of a pseudo-generic raises the price of both the branded and the
true-generic varieties of the product.
Proof. p3b > p
2










t . With β > γ
and t > 0, both conditions hold for any fI ∈ [0, 1].
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The overall impact of the pseudo-generic on consumers does not depend on
these two prices alone, though, as some of them will replace the pseudo-generic
for the other varieties of the product. But that will be of no avail.
Proposition 2 For parameter values satisfying conditions 19, 21, and 22, the
pseudo-generic is more expensive than either the branded product or the true
generic would be in its absence.
Proof. p3pg > p
2






g ⇔ fI < 3− β−γt . These are less
restrictive than condition 21, above, and so always true for the relevant range
of parameter values.
As every price rises with the introduction of the pseudo-generic, we finally
claim that
Corollary 3 For the range of parameter values defined by conditions 19, 21,
and 22, the introduction of a pseudo-generic reduces consumers’surplus.
Thus, for certain parameter values, if the incumbent sells a pseudo-generic,
consumers will be hurt. But we have yet to prove that the incumbent will want
to sell the pseudo-generic. The following proposition establishes the conditions
in which that will happen.
Proposition 4 For parameter values satisfying conditions 19, 21, and 22, sell-
ing the pseudo-generic increases the incumbent’s profit if the pseudo-generic is
perceived as a suffi ciently good substitute for the true-generic (fI is suffi ciently
low) and, if that does not happen, also if either consumers are sensitive to hor-
izontal differentiation (t is not low) or the perceived quality differential between
branded and generic products is significant (β − γ is not low).




> 0: for the relevant range of parameter values, the profitability of
selling the pseudo-generic is decreasing in fI . As condition 19 requires that
fI >
2






> 0. Thus, if fI is suffi ciently close to 25 ,
selling the pseudo-generic is profitable, for any values of the other parameters
in the relevant range. If ∆Π = 0 had no solutions for fI ∈ [0, 1], this would








142tθ + 13θ2 + 7t2
)






142tθ + 13θ2 + 7t2
)
.
The first solution always exceeds 1 and thus places no additional restrictions on
parameter values. The second, however, may lie in the [0, 1] interval. Although
we do not have an analytical solution, visual inspection of this function shows
this only happens if t and β − γ simultaneously take low values; in that case,
suffi ciently high values of fI imply that selling the pseudo-generic is not prof-
itable. Again, visual inspection shows that the critical value of fI , above which
selling the pseudo-generic is not profitable, is always larger than 0.7.
The following numerical example ilustrates these results. Assume t = 0.5,
γ = 1 and β = 76 . Using the formulas above, it is immediate to find that, if the
incumbent does not sell the pseudo-generic, equilibrium is characterized by
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price quantity profit
branded product 0.388 0.777 0.302
generic 0.111 0.222 0.025
Assume, alternatively, that the incumbent sells a pseudo-generic located at
fI = 0.5. Equilibrium values will then be:
price quantity profit
branded product 0.792 0.417 0.330
pseudo-generic 0.583 0.167 0.097
generic 0.417 0.417 0.174
Thus, every price rises, increasing both firms’profits at consumers’expenses.
The intuition for these results can be understood by thinking of the impact
that a price reduction by the incumbent will have on her market share. If she
is not selling the pseudo-generic, the incumbent’s branded product competes
directly against the entrant’s generic, as illustrated in Figure 1: in this situation,
a unitary price reduction by the incumbent steals 1t market share from the
entrant (∂G(pb,pg)∂pb , along 3b). But if incumbent sells the pseudo-generic, this
product interposes between the branded product and the "true"-generic, as
seen in Figure 3: a reduction of the price of the branded product would steal
consumers from its own pseudo-generic (i.e., it would move crb.pg to the left) but
would have no impact on the entrant’s market share (cg.pg would remain the
same and ∂G(pb,pg)∂pb = 0, along 12c). To steal market share from the entrant,
the incumbent would now need to resort to the pseudo-generic price. But a
unitary reduction of the price of the pseudo-generic steals just half as much
market share from the entrant (∂G(pb,ppg,pg)∂ppg =
1
2t , along 12c) as a reduction of
the price of the branded product would if the pseudo-generic was not available.
This is because the two generics are horizontally differentiated and consumers
trade off the reduced price against the higher "transportation costs". Thus, the
incentive to reduce prices is weaker if the pseudo-generic is being sold.
This is aggravated by two other factors. First, reducing the price of the
pseudo-generic will not only capture consumers that would otherwise buy the
true-generic but also others that would buy the incumbent’s, more profitable,
branded product (reducing the price of the pseudo-generic moves crb.pg to the
right).4 Besides, in this model, as usual, prices are strategic complements:
anticipating higher prices by the pseudo-generic selling incumbent, the entrant
herself sets higher prices, further decreasing the incumbent’s incentive to reduce
prices. Thus, the presence of the pseudo-generic softens competition between
the two firms.
4Put it another way, in case the incumbent is a multiproduct firm, decreasing the price of
the the pseudo-generic has a canibalization effect since part of the demand captured with the
price decrease refers to consumers previously buying the other variety sold by the incumbent
- the branded product.
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6 Discussion and further research
This paper illustrates a new theoretical rationale for the fact that the intro-
duction of pseudo-generics can lead to higher prices of all (branded and non-
branded) varieties in the market and reduce consumer surplus. The key feature
of the proposed model is the coexistence of both vertical and horizontal differen-
tiation which we think is a good description of the way pharmaceutical products
market work in reality.
There are other contexts where this coexistence of two types of differentiation
is at work and in which our model may prove insightful. A good example is the
case in which branded products are sold in retail stores along with private labeled
products (sometimes produced by the same firm which sells as well the main
brand available in the market). The empirical literature shows that entry by
store brands is often accompanied by price increases (Ward et al. [8], Bronfrer
and Chintagunta [1]).
In concluding, it should be pointed out that an important limitation to the
previous analysis is the fact that the location of the generic varieties in the
product space are assumed to be exogenously given. Clearly, the assumption
of exogenous “locations”restricts the applicability of the proposed model, since
real life industries product positioning and repositioning is another important
dimension through which firms strategically interact. So, it seems important
to extend the analysis in order to consider cases in which locations are endoge-
nously determined. This will be done in future research. Hopefully, the above
model can be seen as a stepping stone in the direction of a more complete
analysis.
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